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ABSTRACT
Algorithmic discrimination has become one of the critical points in
the discussion about the consequences of an intensively dataﬁed
world. While many scholars address this problem from a purely
techno-centric perspective, others try to raise broader social
justice concerns. In this article, we join those voices and examine
norms, values, and practices among European civil society
organizations in relation to the topic of data and discrimination.
Our goal is to decenter technology and bring nuance into the
debate about its role and place in the production of social
inequalities. To accomplish this, we rely on Nancy Fraser’s theory
of abnormal justice which highlights interconnections between
maldistribution of economic beneﬁts, misrecognition of
marginalized communities, and their misrepresentation in political
processes. Fraser’s theory helps situate technologically mediated
discrimination alongside other more conventional kinds of
discrimination and injustice and privileges attention to economic,
social, and political conditions of marginality. Using a thematic
analysis of 30 interviews with civil society representatives across
Europe’s human rights sector, we bring clarity to this idea of
decentering. We show how many groups prioritize the speciﬁc
experiences of marginalized groups and ‘see through’ technology,
acknowledging its connection to larger systems of
institutionalized oppression. This decentered approach contrasts
the process-oriented perspective of tech-savvy civil society groups
that shy from an analysis of systematic forms of injustice.
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Contemporary discussion about automated computer systems1 is feeding into a moral
panic for which technology is the savior. As mentioned in various (and usually United
States-based) news stories and popular discourse, systems powered by bad data, bad algo-
rithmic models, or both lead to ‘high-tech’ discrimination –misclassiﬁcations, over target-
ing, disqualiﬁcations, and ﬂawed predictions that aﬀect some groups, such as historically
marginalized ones, more than others. To remedy this problem, many argue that the intro-
duction of fair, accountable, and transparent machine learning will thwart biased, racist, or
sexist automated systems, or so the story goes.
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But what computer scientists, engineers, and industry evangelists of fair machine learn-
ing get wrong is the suﬃciency of technical tweaks to prevent or avoid discriminatory out-
comes. This weakness stems not only from the fact that fairness, the counterpart to
discrimination, means many diﬀerent things depending on one’s normative understand-
ing of equality. It also derives from the fact that these competing frameworks marshal
diﬀerent resources and remedies that variously involve laws, institutional policies, and
procedures, as well as require cultural transformation to shift people’s behaviors,
norms, and practices towards individuals and groups that diﬀer from the status quo.
Moreover, as Young (1990) explains, discrimination ties to larger processes of oppression,
which leave socially diﬀerent groups susceptible to processes of violence, marginalization,
exploitation, cultural imperialism, and powerlessness.
In this article, we grapple with the insuﬃciency of a techno-centric focus on data and dis-
crimination by decentering debates on algorithmic bias and data injustices and connecting
them to ongoing and often entrenched debates about traditional discrimination and injus-
tice, which is not technologically mediated. This reﬂexive turn requires acknowledgment not
only of the growing threats of surveillance capitalism (Zuboﬀ, 2019), but also other social
institutions or practices which have contributed to diﬀerential treatment of social groups.
To accomplish this aim, we brieﬂy review the ‘techno-centricity’ of fairness, account-
ability, and transparency studies, as well as data justice studies, which adopt a more socio-
technical approach but which nonetheless privilege technology. We then develop a
normative ‘decentered’ framework that relies on Fraser’s (2010) recent theory of social jus-
tice. We use this framework to analyze how European civil society groups make sense of
data and discrimination. Attending to ideas of maldistribution, misrecognition, and mis-
representation, our thematic analysis of interviews with 30 civil society representatives in
Europe’s human rights sector. We show how many groups prioritize the speciﬁc experi-
ences of marginalized groups and ‘see through’ technology, acknowledging its connection
to larger systems of institutionalized oppression. This decentered approach contrasts the
process-oriented perspective of tech-savvy civil society groups that shy from an analysis of
systematic forms of injustice. We conclude by arguing for a plurality of approaches that
challenges both discriminatory processes (technological or otherwise) and discriminatory
outcomes and that reﬂects the interconnected nature of injustice today.
Technologically mediated discrimination
To appreciate the relevance of Fraser’s theory of justice, it is helpful to understand diﬀer-
ences in how technology has been centered in discussion about discrimination. A compari-
son between the emergent ﬁelds of fairness, accountability, and transparency in machine
learning, on the one hand, and data justice, on the other, also reveals how marginalization
or systems of oppression do – and do not – feature alongside discussions of technology.
Fairness, accountability, transparency, and data justice in automated systems
Members of a highly inﬂuential ﬁeld focus on engineering and technical choices to deal
with problematic automated systems that risk harming speciﬁc groups. This ﬁeld,
known as fairness, accountability, and transparency studies, concentrates on various ethi-
cal dilemmas related to automated computer systems (Barocas, 2015).
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At the outset, fairness, accountability, and transparency studies resonated with early
explorations of the nature of bias in the design of computer systems (Friedman & Nissen-
baum, 1996) and privacy-preserving data mining (Agrawal & Srikant, 2000). Computer
scientists contended with the possibility that data-mining or machine learning algorithms
that are used to power automated systems could distinguish between people with negative
social consequences (Pedreschi, Ruggieri, & Turini, 2008). To avoid designing systems
whose automated decisions lead to prejudice, unfair treatment, and negative and unlawful
discrimination, computer scientists and engineers conceptualized and modeled ways to
identify and avoid the risk of negative discrimination in automated decision systems
(Berendt & Preibusch, 2014).
Today, researchers have identiﬁed numerous criteria for determining whether machine
learning is fair (Narayanan, 2018). As Gürses (2018) argues, the ﬁeld has semantically
moved away from discovery and prevention of harms, bias, or discrimination. Instead,
it puts algorithmic decision making and automated systems in a more positive light, as
concerned with fairness, accountability, and transparency (see also, Dwork & Mulligan,
2013).2 Furthermore, as Binns (2018) suggests, fairness, accountability, and transparency
studies fail to air their value-based assumptions about antidiscrimination or fairness,
remaining inexplicit about their allegiances to any one normative framework. Moreover,
the literature tends to neglect important entrenched debates within political philosophy
about the extent to which ‘all instances of disparity are objectionable’ (Binns, 2018,
p. 2). As a result, the ﬁeld ends up with technical solutions that are overly simplistic
and ill equipped to accommodate the complexity of social life. In fact, fairness, account-
ability, and transparency studies may overstate the power of technology, generally, and
‘fairness constraints’ or parametric decision rules in automated computer systems, speciﬁ-
cally, to achieve their intended design or engineering aims.
By contrast to fairness, accountability, and transparency scholars, an emergent group of
researchers focused on data justice oﬀers a wider perspective through which to consider
the problem of algorithmic discrimination. 3 In formative writings on the idea of data jus-
tice, scholars appeal to frameworks for wellbeing, to post-structural inﬂuenced theories of
justice, and to constructivist understandings of technology (as always value-laden) (Den-
cik, Hintz, & Cable, 2016; Heeks & Renken, 2016; Johnson, 2014; Taylor, 2017). These
studies make explicit what equality of data collection, data analytics, and automated
data-driven decision-making is for. That is, while fairness, accountability, and transpar-
ency studies concentrate on deﬁning ‘fairness constraints’ and what equality is, data justice
studies consider what equality is for (see also Sen, 1980). In short, if studies of fairness,
accountability, and transparency are centered in the technical domain, then data justice
leans towards the sociotechnical.
With their attention to data-driven harms as well as opportunities, data justice studies
navigate an uneasy boundary between technological and social determinism. On the one
hand, the ﬁeld surfaces negative externalities caused by data-driven technologies and, as
seen in the work of Heeks and Renken (2016), examines structural data injustices. On
the other hand, data justice studies oﬀer a range of data governance models to avoid or
curtail the deterministic powers of such technologies. For example, Taylor (2017) appeals
to process freedoms for meaningful participation in data governance, while Johnson
(2016) advocates for participatory design, inclusive data science, and social movements
for data justice.
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(Dis)advantages of seeing discrimination through technology
Though it might go without saying, both ﬁelds agree unequivocally that the technical
facets of discrimination matter. Even though they vary in their interpretation of causes
and eﬀects of a technical algorithmic form of discrimination, the above scan reveals
powerful insights into the role of technology in discrimination. Fairness, accountability,
and transparency studies admit that algorithmic discrimination can mimic ordinary or
more conventional forms of discrimination. They believe that engineers and computer
scientists can instantiate fairness or engineer discrimination-aware data mining and
machine learning. Meanwhile, data justice scholars concentrate on human-centered
data governance, albeit in a way that accepts technology’s power and the notion that it
ought to and can be just. Either way, technology lies at the center of these ﬁelds’ concerns.
The focus on system design and engineering as well as data governance is both an asset
and an albatross, however. It is an asset, because discrimination’s various conceptualiz-
ations do not typically have a nuanced view of the role of technology. From Lippert-Ras-
mussen’s (2014) emphasis on diﬀerential treatment on the basis of membership in a social
group, to Makkonen’s (2012) attention to institutional and structural to intersectional
approaches to discrimination (Crenshaw, 1991), sociological and legal approaches do
not privilege the role of technology in institutionalized racism, sexism, and other forms
of oppression. In this sense, this techno-centric literature ﬁlls a gap.
The technical focus, however, is equally a liability. It seems to prioritize technical forms
of discrimination or unfairness at the expense of other techniques faced by individuals or
groups who systematically bear the risks and harms of a discriminatory society.4 So while
techniques may vary and evolve over time, discrimination’s target may be the same. What
remains constant is the marginality and deprivation experienced by socially silenced
groups. ‘Who’ matters as much as ‘how.’
In other words, unmediated (or conventional) discrimination exists alongside techno-
logically mediated techniques of discrimination. Algorithmic discrimination and exclu-
sionary automated systems represent one element of a larger ecosystem of
discriminatory practices and procedures, and any diagnosis of problems or prescription
for remedies would beneﬁt from some measure of reﬂexivity in relation to this ecosystem.
Reconceptualizing data, discrimination, and injustice: a reﬂexive turn
towards what, who, and how
As raised in the last section, technologically mediated discrimination exists alongside other
forms of discrimination that contribute to the systemic marginalization of individuals and
groups marked by social diﬀerence. Such cohabitation, we argue, requires a reﬂexive turn
that decenters data and data-driven technologies in the debate on discrimination to recog-
nize the broader forms of systemic oppression and injustice that yield both unmediated
and mediated forms of discrimination. In other words, a reﬂexive turn in the debate on
data-centered discrimination would help position sociotechnical systems of discrimi-
nation alongside other modalities and oﬀer nuance into what injustice discrimination
causes, who is aﬀected, and how discrimination can be remedied.
To guide this eﬀort of decentering data and technology, the work of Nancy Fraser
(2010) provides a model. Fraser, whose most recent project is to deﬁne what she calls
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abnormal injustice and, conversely, abnormal justice, adopts a pragmatist’s approach in
order to deconstruct the confusing and complex systems of governance in a globalized
world. For Fraser, injustice and justice are historically contingent ideas that demand con-
sideration of not only what is unequal, but also who is unequal and how inequality is
inscribed in political institutions. In her analysis (Fraser, 2010; see also Fraser & Honneth,
2006), she argues that whereas nineteenth and twentieth century problems of injustice pri-
marily corresponded to problems of economic distribution and hence class, twenty-ﬁrst
century injustice involves additional problems of disrespect for social groups and political
exclusion and, accordingly, culture and politics. In these ‘abnormal’ times, institutions,
decision makers, and constituents disagree about the relative importance of maldistribu-
tion, misrecognition, and misrepresentation and the role of class, culture, and politics in
the conception of a just society.
As a result, Fraser argues, a more adequate theory of justice must recognize the inter-
relation between the ‘what,’ ‘who,’ and ‘how’ of justice.5 While class-conscious distributive
advocates emphasize the ‘what,’ advocates of cultural recognition focus on the ‘who’ of jus-
tice that advocates of cultural recognition emphasize, and civically minded supporters of
political inclusion emphasize the ‘how,’ a theory abnormal of justice sees the what, who,
and how in relational terms. No single priority prevails or constitutes the center of a just
society. At every turn, injustices of what, who, and how are interlinked and interfere with
participatory parity, or the ability of every social actor to participate meaningfully in
society on par with others (2010).
Fraser’s work adds nuance to how discrimination is both understood and remedied.
Her tripartite theory of justice interconnects the what, who, and how of discrimination.
Discrimination is as much a matter of class as it is of culture and politics, and originates
as much from class hierarchies as from status and political hierarchies. Discrimination is
consequential for the distribution of material wealth in society, as it is for the reinforce-
ment of certain groups’ privilege or domination over others or for the exclusion of particu-
lar structures and styles of democratic governance. As Fraser would argue, abnormal times
reveal how discrimination functions as a multifaceted problem that demands a multi-
plicity of solutions.
This model has implications for conceptualizing the role of technology in a just society.
The attention to class, culture, and politics and on participatory parity appears to position
technology as an adjunct, as opposed to a primary protagonist, in class- or status-reinfor-
cing hierarchies and institutional and administrative barriers to organizing around anti-
discrimination policies and practices. This is particularly pronounced with respect to
questions of the ‘who’ of injustice and cultural hegemony. For Fraser, status-reinforcing
hierarchies that lead to cultural domination originate in the realm of symbolic as opposed
to the material (see also Young, 1990, 2000). Technology might amplify processes of sym-
bolic meaning making and impact social construction of identity markers, but technology
diﬀers from religion or other social institutions that generate the grounds for othering and
subordination.
In total, Fraser’s theory illustrates that injustice is multifaceted and lacks a singular
source or solution. While it might be tempting to link the conditions of an unjust society
to the proliferation of automated computer systems or growth of surveillance capitalism,
Fraser’s tripartite theory of justice helps to clarify that technology assists and exists along-
side, as opposed to at the center of a discriminatory and unjust society.
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Studying data and discrimination in the wild
If we conceptualize data-driven technologies as one among many techniques of discrimi-
nation and data-driven discrimination as one facet of an unjust society, to what extent
does a decentered discourse exist in the real world? To answer this question and for the
remainder of this article, we turn to a thematic analysis to understand how European
civil society understands data-driven discrimination and connects between data, discrimi-
nation, and inequalities. Rather than approach our investigation from the perspective of
what civil society knows, does not know, or needs to know about problems of unfair algor-
ithms or data injustice, our study explores the terrain and texture of civil society discourse
on data and data-driven technologies, including when and how technology plays a role in
civil society organization’s work on discrimination as well as who is impacted and how
discrimination can be prevented. We asked: How does European civil society understand
and encounter automated computer systems, data, and discrimination? To what extent
does maldistribution, misrecognition, or misrepresentation factor into these understand-
ings or encounters?
To answer these questions, we narrowed our attention to the norms, values, and prac-
tices of European civil society organizations, speciﬁcally those focused on social and
human rights (Sanchez Salgado, 2014).6 These organizations serve as critical actors in pub-
lic debate, build greater understanding of social concerns, and have unique governance
and organizational features (Fuller & McCauley, 2016; Salamon, Sokolowski, & List,
2003). Due to the diverse character of the analyzed population, our sampling method
relied on a mix of maximum variation and snowball strategies to identify a relevant sample
population. We generated a list of 50 organizations from grantee lists, issue networks, and
organizational networks, aiming for roughly equal distribution across diﬀerent regions
(North, South, East, West) as well as the entirety of the European Union. Our semi-struc-
tured interview protocol invited representatives (typically senior-level employees focused
on program work) to talk about opinions and experiences, as well as future programmatic
work. Because our four pilot interviewees did not understand or identify with the terms
algorithmic discrimination or data-driven discrimination, we modiﬁed our protocol to
include general questions about technology, data, and discrimination, with follow-up
probes about automated technologies. We conducted interviews from August 2017 until
March 2018.
Figure 1. Number of European civil society organizations (by type).
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Results presented below are based on interviews with 30 representatives of 28 diﬀerent
civil society organizations, which represent four main types (Figure 1) and which operate
in the European Union (Figure 2). In addition to single- and multi-issue organizations, our
sample includes foundations and umbrella organizations (e.g., professional networks or
associations). Adopting an iterative strategy (Boyatzis, 2009), we developed a coding
frame that allowed us to identify thematic networks (Attride-Stirling, 2001) including
those linked to maldistribution, misrecognition, and misrepresentation, as well as those
that elucidate what discrimination entails, who is aﬀected, how it might be challenged,
and when and how technology intersects these issues.
Results
By and large, our interviewees did not share stories about automated computer systems
and for those that did, data-driven discrimination was neither an organic nor a primary
concern. Across the seven themes presented below, data and digital technology, more
broadly, did feature in the discussion of discrimination, though interviewees did not
characterize them as the source of injustice Figure 3.
Theme 1: for members of marginalized groups, misrecognition and
maldistribution feed into discrimination
Our interviewees represent a very diverse group of activists and advocates ﬁghting injus-
tices and inequalities that aﬀect the life experiences of marginalized communities. A
majority of them drew links between discrimination and forms of injustice, which they
typically articulated in relation to lack of digniﬁed treatment (misrecognition) or lack of
equal rights or access to services (maldistribution). The experience of marginalization
of constituents or communities they serve threaded across these discussion, whereas
data and technology were muted.
Interconnected stories of misrecognition and maldistribution revolved primarily
around four distinct groups: Romani, migrants, poor people (especially the unhoused),
Figure 2. Number of European civil society organizations (by area of operation).
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and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) community.
Discussion of Romani populations centered on stories about police brutality, such as when
‘police raided a village in Slovakia… beating men, women, and children’ (SG 6), and pro-
blems with Romani access to healthcare, education, and other public and private services
and often linked anti-Romanyism to nationalism and populist policy. Struggles involving
LGBTQ individuals centered on hate speech, violence, or employment discrimination,
which interviewees linked to institutional oppression, traditional societal views, or conser-
vative religious values. Stories of migrants, particularly those from Middle East, North
Africa, or Eastern Europe, detailed racial proﬁling by police, as well as, again, hate speech,
workplace discrimination, and unequal access to basic services, which interviewees con-
nected to Europe’s ‘racist practices,’ ‘history of colonialism,’ and ‘myth of white Christian
Europe’ (SG 2). Unequal access to rights featured in talk about poor people and the
unhoused, a problem that interviewees linked to cultural stereotypes and disrespect for
‘the weakest members of society who have less access to resources and…money’ (AP 4).
However, not all interviewees talked about racism or colonialism or spoke to speciﬁc
groups’ experiences. As contrasted with representatives of antipoverty groups, organiz-
ations advocating for speciﬁc groups, and generalist human rights organizations, intervie-
wees from digital and consumer rights groups emphasized the universality of the problems
they address. (See also Theme 7 below.)
Theme 2: data for equality matter
For those representing antipoverty and human rights groups, lack of data about margin-
alized groups means greater marginalization. Otherwise stated, civil society groups need
Figure 3. Networked thematic analysis (by organizational type).
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data to make the case for equal treatment. Most commonly, data for equality related to the
idea of redistribution and, to a lesser degree, representation. For example, interviewees tes-
tiﬁed about the ways that data collection of protected information could rectify inequal-
ities between groups. As one interviewee said:
[P]eople of African descents and Muslims really push for data collection because they realize
that their realities are ignored… [Data] should be part of your obligation to also promote
equality and report on what you’ve done so this is part of the equality planning. (SG 2)
A few interviewees addressed issues of political participation, stating that data about mar-
ginalized groups could help them shape policies according to their needs.
Some interviewees acknowledged the risks of data collection and acknowledged the
importance of necessary legal safeguards:
I very much support the idea of data collection in the context of discrimination, including
sensitive data only under the circumstances that are provided by law – that it’s anonymous,
that the people categorize themselves, and that they agree on giving the data. (HR 8)
But collecting more data raised concern, especially amongst representatives of digital and
consumer rights groups. One participant stressed: ‘social [justice] groups, environmental
groups, ﬁnancial debt groups, can be at loggerheads with digital rights groups over this
kind of thing’ (DCR 6).
On balance, the idea of data for equality might appear as technologically centered since
digital tools can aid data collection and analysis. But our interviewees alluded to data-dri-
ven research in a more classic (or ‘small data’) sense while neglecting the topic of algorith-
mic systems. Moreover, they saw data for equality as just one element as opposed to a main
solution for the problem of discrimination. In this sense, data for equality subordinates
technology to a greater social cause or policy.
Theme 3: data collection marginalizes the already marginalized
Many of the marginalized groups excluded from datasets also face targeted and pervasive
surveillance. More often than not, our interviewees connected the problem with broader
issues of misrecognition: whether related to information collection, sharing, or analysis by
state actors like police, border guards, and public prosecutors, the condition of being
hypersurveilled depends on harmful and targeted stereotyping and is justiﬁed in terms
of public safety or other social values.
Our interviewees connected the misuse of sensitive data (e.g., nationality, economic sta-
tus, ethnicity) to discrimination and other rights violations. Three examples – none of
which involve sophisticated automation – stand out. One interviewee spoke about a
Roma register, which local Swedish police created for their jurisdiction, but which
expanded to include the Roma community countrywide. A second case also involved
the misuse of sensitive data in Poland, whereby a city government tried to create a data-
base of unhoused or homeless individuals, accessible not only by shelter providers (to
manage resources), but also courts and police access (to ensure public safety). The third
case, which involved a data sharing agreement between the British government’s Home
Oﬃce and the National Health Service, targeted migrants, leading many to avoid of the
healthcare system for fear of surveillance.
890 S. P. GANGADHARAN AND J. NIKLAS
In the above examples, algorithmic systems again are far from the focal point. More-
over, the politics of data collection connect to the reproduction of broader injustices.
Again, as with the above point about data for equality, data or the technology which sup-
ports data collection regimes connect to border social problems and have roots in harmful
stereotypes and stigmatization of social groups.
Theme 4: context-ignorant systems harm life chances and decrease the dignity of
the marginalized
Interviewees shared how database system design is ﬂawed and neglects speciﬁc margina-
lized groups with dire material and emotional consequences. A clear example of this
relates to national identiﬁcation systems. In Sweden, for example, national ID numbers
have a gender marker (i.e., a numerical code related to one’s gender assigned at birth).
When someone changes their legal gender, the national ID number also changes. As
one interviewee explained: ‘[P]rivate companies… government agencies… and every
oﬃcial… all ask for your person number… So, if you change that, then a number of pro-
blematic situations arise’ (SG 9), including the inability to access prior customer records or
health history.
Similarly, migrants from Ukraine and Belarus in Poland face routine, bureaucratic
obstacles that prevent them from obtaining PESEL, a personal ID number. Exclusion
from PESEL has cascading eﬀects, given that PESEL unlocks access to numerous public
services. Describing the education system and diﬀerential treatment, one interviewee
described how a migrant whose child lacks a PESEL is locked out of online enrollment
systems for nursery and kindergarten:
You cannot insert a child to the online form at the moment when there is no PESEL…And
then she [the mother] goes with her broken Polish to kindergarten, trying to explain to some-
body. And here it starts: “Ah… you are not from Poland?” (SG 1)
In both examples, interviewees acknowledge that technical solutions that could improve
the data collection, identiﬁcation or online tools. In this sense, technology (though not
necessarily automated computer systems) is centered, not only in the deﬁnition of a pro-
blem faced by members of marginalized communities but also as part of the solution to the
problem. However, again, interviewees acknowledge that what motivates the deﬁnition of
harms is deeply rooted in social history and goes far beyond those technological
arrangements.
Theme 5: automation in the welfare state will amplify powerlessness of the
marginalized
When thinking about the future of welfare administration, interviewees surfaced concerns
about the harmful impacts of automated computers systems. Here, interviewees cham-
pioned a well-functioning welfare state and its task of distributing goods and services.
They also emphasized the need for fair procedures that ensure the dignity of welfare reci-
pients. Our interviewees considered beneﬁts of advanced technologies, though worried
about dehumanization. Welfare administration
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requires personal interaction and it requires a person with experience, knowledge, and ability
to listen to what the clients have said in order to understand and to identify what the issues
and the obstacles are and what the solutions are. (AP 4)
Moreover, new ‘hi-tech’ systems risk reﬂecting politicized debates about welfare, including
the goal of denying ‘beneﬁts to as many people as possible’ (AP 2).
But, according to interviewees, the problem is not so much the technology itself but
already existing problems of public administration. Welfare recipients who face welfare
bureaucracy already feel powerless, and automation may worsen their powerlessness:
[A]lready… people in public employment services… behaved kind of like computers. [Y]ou
either… ﬁt into this box, or you don’t. And if you don’t, “Goodbye.”… [B]ut there was hope
because you’re thinking, “They’re still human beings.” (AP 2)
For interviewees, technology and procedures used in welfare administration must meet
people’s needs and capabilities and keep humans in the loop. Participatory models for
designing new automated procedures or tools could help this effort.
In all, the theme exempliﬁes the subordinate place of technology in a larger political
problem: the architecture of welfare state. While automated systems factor into this archi-
tecture, and while questions about fair administrative procedure abound, technology is a
secondary concern to the larger problem that prompted automated welfare’s implemen-
tation (i.e., austerity).
Theme 6: automation spells limited choice and higher prices for the marginalized
A small minority of mainly digital and consumer rights groups talked about the misuse of
data by companies. Here conversations yoked problems of technology to issues of margin-
alization in the context of data-driven price diﬀerentiation.
According to one participant, many companies use personalized pricing to oﬄoad risk
onto consumers. Interviewees also acknowledged that certain populations, such as the
elderly, would experience data-driven markets diﬀerently. One said:
[M]isuses of data can lead to discrimination… and aﬀect consumers that are in the most vul-
nerable positions… [T]argeted ads to speciﬁc demographics who are more likely to be in
ﬁnancial trouble. They get targeted with toxic stuﬀ. (DCR 3)
But while interviewees expressed anxieties about price-based discrimination, they held few
remedies to the problem. Some suggested transparency rules as a way to uncover bad prac-
tices, while others stressed the need for new governance models and state oversight.
Compared to other ideas, this consumer-oriented theme is a very clear example when
the technology and data represent a central matter of concern. Interviewees spoke about
detecting, governing, and addressing speciﬁc data governance issues. When they linked
them to the condition of marginality, they concentrated on the mechanics of diﬀerential
pricing.
Theme 7: work on algorithmic discrimination has limited appeal
For a generalist human rights organization, plus the same groups mentioned in the ‘Lim-
ited choice, higher prices’ theme above, privacy and data rights, not discrimination, are
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paramount concerns. Here, the reference to redistribution, recognition, or representation
was nearly completely lacking. Interviewees spoke about mass surveillance programmers,
the broad powers of secret service and law enforcement, and cavalier companies who vio-
late European data protection rules. These conversations did not mention speciﬁc popu-
lations and suggested that all individuals are equally harmed.
Attention to ‘everyone’ by digital and consumer rights groups ties to norms and values.
One interviewee explained:
[P]rivacy and freedom of speech can be a bipartisan issue. But discrimination is, much more
progressive, inherently progressive force with a particular type of progressive ideology…
[W]e don’t feel that we have a mandate to speak out against racism. (DCR 8)
Meanwhile, organizations working on issues of poverty, discrimination, and minority
rights tended to treat digital issues as peripheral to the ‘bigger’ problems they face.
Some interviewees said that while critical questions biased machines may be important,
they would not work on these problems. They claimed that violence against speciﬁc groups
and other injustices often take place without technologies or data. As one participant sta-
ted, ‘The issue [of algorithmic discrimination] you are talking about is very sublime, soph-
isticated. Maybe things are already happening and are happening, but…we have a lot of
work to do’ (SG 3). Altogether, privacy advocates and antidiscrimination showed luke-
warm interest in engaging in problems of algorithmic discrimination.
Discussion
The themes above evidence a number of divisions and gaps that help elucidate what it
means to decenter technology in discourse – and action – on discrimination. First, misre-
presentation or exclusion from political decision making did not feature much in conver-
sations about discrimination, data, and technology. Some interviewees implicitly
addressed representation by referencing problems of discrimination as linked to individ-
uals’ inability to access their full rights as citizens. But on the whole, representation was a
blind spot in conversation, a point that is interesting especially in relation to calls for
developing a movement for data justice and public exposure of problematic data collection
or use (for examples see Dencik et al., 2016; Johnson, 2014). We acknowledge, however,
that the dearth of attention to representation might be a function of the particularity of
European civil society and our focus on already professionalized groups (as opposed to
social movement ones).
A second noteworthy gap is our research did not yield evidence of high-level interest or
engagement in topics related to algorithmic discrimination. The timing of our interviews
(August 2017-March 2018) may have factored into the muted attention to algorithmic dis-
crimination. The story of misuse of social media data by Cambridge Analytica to sway
elections broke as we were concluding data collection. Prior to this scandal, news reporting
on algorithmic discrimination was poor, in spite of a looming implementation deadline for
the General Data Protection Regulation (Gangadharan & Niklas, 2018).
Nevertheless, diﬀerences in norms, values, and practices vis-à-vis technology’s central
role in social injustice are also at play and reveal important divisions in European civil
society. Many of our interviewees discussed more conventional forms of discrimination.
The theme of ‘data for equality’ underscores this point. In contrast to privacy and data
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protection arguments against more data collection (Barocas, 2015), advocates who pushed
to collect more data about members of historically marginalized groups want to do so to
achieve better outcomes in life. Interviewees’ conversations addressed conditions which
contributed to lack of opportunity or access to resources, as well as solutions that
would equally distribute rights and beneﬁts to all populations, such as members of
Roma, LGBTQ, and other minorities. Data for equality is rooted in eﬀorts to challenge
marginalization.
Digital and consumer rights advocates took a diﬀerent tack. For example, they did oﬀer
limited commentary about algorithmic systems, but their generalized statements referred
to well-known cases from the United States, rather than European examples in their areas
of operation. Moreover, discussion shifted from data and discrimination to privacy and
data protection quickly. Some advocates connected to latter topics precisely because of
their recollections of challenging collaborations between digital rights and antidiscrimina-
tion groups, such as campaigns to safeguard against hate speech. Topics of data protection
represented more comfortable spaces for discussion and allowed interviewees to engage in
talk of the European General Data Protection Regulation, data processing, data holders,
and data subjects.
Had our research included groups from the South (see Figure 2), we do not believe our
results would diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Norms, values, and practices of digital rights and human
rights groups do diﬀer (Dencik et al., 2016; Dunn &Wilson, 2013), and these diﬀerent sec-
tors function as ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1992, p. 3). While geography inﬂuences
such communities, and data and technology aﬀect the work of human rights groups in
Southern Europe (Topak, 2014), aﬀected populations remain a primary concern for
such groups. Nevertheless, to fully understand the nature of epistemic communities, we
welcome additional research that highlights the uniqueness of human rights sector within
and between countries and regions.
Had our sample population not included digital and consumer rights groups, the dearth
of attention to algorithmic discrimination might be unremarkable. But given that even
digital and consumer rights tentatively and superﬁcially broached the topic, the omission
reveals a big diﬀerence in how digital and consumer rights groups speak about those popu-
lations or communities who are aﬀected by discrimination and related injustices. The
majority of themes articulated above relate to speciﬁc marginalized groups, whereas
only the ‘limited engagement’ theme reveals references to ‘all’ or ‘everyone’ by digital
and consumer rights groups. When one consumer rights group elaborated on dynamic
pricing in relation to speciﬁc vulnerable groups, the interviewee speculated in vague, gen-
eralized terms.
In addition, while digital and consumer rights primarily represent the biggest critics of
dataﬁcation, they lack a vocabulary to discuss discrimination. They called out data protec-
tion violations, conceptualized surveillance as a problem that impacts all individuals
equally, and championed universal privacy rights, and then shied from a discussion of
misrecognition, maldistribution, and social diﬀerence. Digital and consumer rights groups
rarely spoke to discrimination directly, referring to discrimination and challenging it as
the domain of other ‘progressive groups.’ Their counterparts, by contrast, were ﬂuent in
the language of maldistribution and misrecognition. Evoking Nancy Fraser, they often
connected the two: whether aﬃrming the need for data for equality or criticizing margin-
alizing forms of data collection, poorly designed systems, or the threat of greater
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dehumanization in the welfare system they blended an analysis of unfair distribution of
resources, services, or goods with that of a critique of racism, colonialism, or, in other
words, practices of cultural domination.
The divide between those who prioritize digital technology and those who do not
echoes what others have noted about debates about technology governance, including gov-
ernance of other, older communication technologies. In the United States, this division
was laid bare when activists who embraced an explicit analysis of social, racial, and econ-
omic inequalities in marginalized communities delineated themselves as committed to the
idea of media justice, as opposed to media reform which frames problems of concentration
in the media industry as damaging to all citizens and consumers (Gangadharan, 2014;
Cyril, 2005, 2008; Snorton, 2010). In more recent times, digital rights activists have aligned
themselves with ‘all’ versus ‘speciﬁc groups,’ criticizing mass surveillance as opposed to
targeted surveillance of already highly surveilled communities (Gürses, Kundnani, &
Van Hoboken, 2016). Meanwhile activists aligned with environmental, labor, as well as
other identity-based rights movements, have appeared nonplussed by Snowden revel-
ations while digital rights activists have sounded the alarm (Dencik et al., 2016).
In the face of such divisions, many would call for bridging, including broader awareness
among social, racial, or economic justice advocates of the ways in which technology
‘works.’ But we propose that the divisions between digital rights advocates other advocates,
including those serving speciﬁc groups and/or their rights, clariﬁes the concept decenter-
ing. The division shows us that technology animates ‘non-techie’ civil society groups inso-
far as technological problems connect to speciﬁc marginalized groups. Antipoverty
organizations, advocates for the rights of speciﬁc groups, and human rights groups
think technology is important but in relational terms. Data collection and data-driven sys-
tems concern these groups when they interfere with marginalized peoples’ ability to live
digniﬁed lives, meet their basic needs, and have a fair chance at opportunity.
In this sense, these kinds of civil society organizations already have a decentered
approach to technology in the discourse on discrimination. Their manner of decentering
is to ‘see through’ technology and position it in relation to systems of oppression, whose
norms and values are wired in and function as instruments of control, subordination, and
normalization. The activists with whom we spoke see power through the design,
implementation, and operation of technological systems. They pointed out forms of
powerlessness that already exist and the extent to which database systems, for example,
both exclude and target, the eﬀects of which lead to greater social control and marginali-
zation. This perspective on technology resonates with what surveillance studies and
science and technology studies have been saying for decades. Whether Winner’s (1986)
interest in the politics of technology, Gandy’s (1993) notion of the panoptic sort (1993),
Gilliom’s (2001) interests in computerized overseers of the poor, or Monahan’s (2008)
concept of ‘marginalizing surveillance’ (p. 220), technology extends power and can be
designed to systematically disadvantage marginalized groups.
Moreover, the themes focused on marginalizing data collection, poorly designed sys-
tems that normalize, and dehumanizing automated systems suggest that while individual
developers may not be sexist, racist, classist, or otherwise guilty, such technological pro-
jects, as a whole, can be tied to larger processes of marginalization. Decentering, in
other words, requires that we probe the larger contexts that motivate technological pro-
jects, their deployment, and use and look beyond narrowly deﬁned illegal forms of
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discrimination. Better-designed welfare automation (e.g., fair algorithms) may not save a
shrinking welfare state or be the best instrument for transforming cultural understanding
of the poor.
Our results also suggest that decentering means beginning and ending with marginality,
as opposed to leading with technology, data governance, or digital rights. This does not
exclude or devalue technically centered approaches. To be clear, our interviewees admitted
the importance of data protection measures (e.g., anonymity for the homeless) and advo-
cated for special data rights (e.g., more inclusive national ID systems for transgender
people). They also relied on or supported data protection law to demonstrate discrimi-
nation (e.g., against the Roma by Swedish police, data for equality or collecting data to
show diﬀerential treatment). But across these examples, civil society representatives
have tilted data governance and digital rights towards an outcome of a more equal and
just society, rather than talk about problematic data, problematic data collection, or pro-
blematic uses of data in abstract terms or in isolation from larger societal problems.
Conclusion: towards alignment
With decentering, it is possible to recognize the speciﬁc impacts of technologically
mediated discrimination without claiming its totalizing eﬀects. Problems of discrimina-
tory data mining or unfair machine learning are signiﬁcant, and they do not constitute
the primary means by which discrimination, unfairness, or injustice is or will be practiced.
Similarly, problems of data collection, open data projects, or other data-based (though not
automated) initiatives are also signiﬁcant, and they do not constitute the primary means
by which discrimination, unfairness, or injustice is or will be practiced.
This suggests two reﬂective points. First, it is worth comparing between diﬀerent pro-
blems of abnormal justice: problems of the data economy or surveillance capitalism; pro-
blems unattributable or less attributable to the data economy; institutional legacies of
racism, colonialism, sexism, heterosexism, and so forth; and erosion of institutions of
democratic contestation. Data and data-driven systems cannot claim all the credit for
structural inequalities of an unjust society. This means we ought to consider, for example,
data violence (Hoﬀmann, 2018) alongside structural violence and racist search engines
(Noble, 2018) alongside racism perpetuated by social institutions. Second, technical ana-
lyses, especially fairness, accountability, and transparency studies, would beneﬁt from a
deeper exploration of potential negative externalities of automated systems. In their
exploration of optimization technologies, Overdorf, Kulynych, Balsa, Troncoso, and
Gürses (2018) oﬀer clues to how this can be done. Nuanced historical context of the dis-
crimination to which automated systems belongs will also add much needed texture to the
abstract computational models. Without this, challenging technologically mediated dis-
crimination risks insularity at a time when a just society demands greater interconnection
and alignment between diverse epistemic communities.
Notes
1. Altogether, systems that variously employ algorithms or use learning models are referred to
as automated computer systems, data-driven systems, algorithmic systems, intelligent sys-
tems, expert systems, machine learning, or automated systems.
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2. The ﬁeld now organizes a high proﬁle, closely watched conference known for its ‘thought lea-
dership’ on data ethics in the academy, industry, and government.
3. Data justice scholarship is diverse and emergent. Nevertheless, we use ‘data justice studies’ in
recognition of the growth in justice-oriented approaches to examining dataiﬁcation.
4. For examples of the many techniques of discrimination, see Hagman (1971) and Greenberg
(2010).
5. Note that Fraser’s theorization evokes earlier work by Young, who paid close attention to
issues of representation and closely considered ‘how’ in political decision making (Young,
1990, 1997, 2000).
6. For brevity, we use the term ‘human rights’ to refer to both social and human rights groups.
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